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NOTES AND COMMENT
While it may be granted that the Act does not violate the interstate commerce clause or the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
its retroactive feature does seem to attempt to alter and amend executed contracts. Will the Supreme Court deem it advisable to take
advantage of the separability clause and its prerogative of "separating
the chaff from the wheat", thus cutting out the retroactive portion
while preserving the valid sections of the Act?
While the highest court in the land enjoys a reputation of rare
conservatism, it has been known in the past to perform astonishing
feats of judicial reasoning in order to sustain legislation which has
met with the Court's approval.
In the light of the known status of Mr. Justice Van Devanter
and Chief Justice Hughes, who, it must always be remembered, wrote
the opinions in the Second Employers' Liability cases and the
"Shreveport" case, the liberal bloc of Benjamin Cardozo, Louis
Brandeis, Harlan F. Stone and Owen J. Roberts should be able to
influence the Supreme Court in holding the Railroad Retirement Act
valid, if not in full, at least in part.
JOHN

E.

FREESE.

POWER OF TRUSTEES TO LEASE-INSTRUCTIONS.
A TRUSTEE, AFTER SECURING THE APPROVAL OF A LONG TERM
LEASE BY THE SUPREME COURT UNDER SECTIONS 106 AND 107 OF THE
REAL PROPERTY LA W, 1 HAS NO AUTHORITY TO MODIFY THE TERMS
2
OF SAID LEASE, WITHOUT A LIKE APPROVAL BY THE COURT.
THE COURTS WILL NOT DECIDE QUESTIONS OF BUSINESS JUDGMENT, BUT WILL LEAVE THEM TO THE TRUSTEE.

1. Power to lease for term of trust estate.
It has never been doubted that a trustee who is charged with
the receipt and disposal of the income of real property necessarily
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act or application of such

provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
" N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW §106. A trustee appointed to hold real property
during the life of a beneficiary, and to pay or apply the rents, income and
profits thereof to, or for, the use of such beneficiary, may execute and deliver
a lease of such real property for a term not exceeding five years, without application to the court. The Supreme Court may, by order, on such terms and
conditions as seem just and proper, in respect to rentals and renewals, authorize
such a trustee to lease such real property for a term exceeding five years, if it
appears to the satisfaction of the court that it is for the best interest of the
trust estate.
§107. Provides for notice to beneficiary and other persons interested
where real property affected by a trust is conveyed, mortgaged or leased, and
procedure thereon.
'City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Smith, 263 N. Y. 292, 189 N. E. 222
(1934), aff'd on reargument, 264 N. Y. 396, 191 N. E. 720 (1934).
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has implied authority to lease the property, otherwise he could obtain no income from it. 3 This implied power extends only to leases
which are reasonable. Such leases will bind the trust property only
so long as the trust continues. 4 The mere fact that the term of the
lease extends, or will extend, beyond the term of the trust does not
render the lease totally void; it is only invalid to the extent of the
excess.5 But by Section 106 of the Real Property Law, a lease for
five years or less will bind the trust property, if the trust should
terminate before the expiration of the term of the lease. 6 A lease
for a definite term of years is not violative of the statute.7 A trustee
has no implied power to lease on terms contrary to the ordinary or
usual custom of the situs of the property.8 If the trust consists of
farmland, the trustee can grant ordinary farming leases; if of buildings in'a city, he can grant the ordinary leases of such property. 9
If the lease is unreasonable a court of equity may interfere to protect
the interests of the beneficiary, always having due regard for the
rights of bona fide lessees. 10 In determining when a lease is reasonable the court considers the intent of the settlor, the nature of the
property, the customs of the locality, the conditions of the estate
and the probable period of the trust."
2. Power to lease for term extending beyond duration of the trust.
In the absence of the consent of remaindermen,' 2 expressed authority in the trust instrument, 13 or statute, 14 a trustee has no power
'it re Hubbell's Trust, 135 Iowa 637, 113 N. W. 512 (f907) ; Hedges v.
Riker, 5 Johns. Ch. 163 (N. Y. 1821); Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491
(1858) ; Corse v. Corse, 144 N. Y. 569, 38 N. E. 630 (1895) ; Weir v. Barker,
104 App. Div. 112, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1150 (2d Dept. 1905); Frankford Trust
Co. v. Schulte, Inc., 302 Pa. 421 156 Atl. 746 (1931); O'TooLE, LAW OF
TRUSTS (1933) 85, §77; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (6th ed. 1911) §484;
1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) 205.
'Weir v. Barker, supra; Hubbell v. Hubbell, 172 Iowa 538, 154 N. W. 867
(1915); Matter of the City of New York (110th St.), 81 App. Div. 27, 81 N.
Y. Supp. 32 (1st Dept. 1903), the court said at page 35 (Supp. 37): "While
we reach the conclusion that the trustee had no power to lease beyond the term
of the trust estate * * *, we are of the opinion that such leases are valid while

such trust estate endures." Matter of Armory Board, 29 Misc. 174, 60 N. Y.
Supp. 882 (1899).
Ibid.
Corse v. Corse, Weir v. Barker, both upra note 3.
' Frankford Trust Co. v. Schulte, Inc., supra note 3; see Barker v. Barker,
172 8App. Div. 244, 158 N. Y. Supp. 413 (2d Dept. 1916).
Newcomb v. Keteltas, 19 Barb. 608 (N. Y. 1855); Hedges v. Riker,
supra note 3.
9 Greason v. Keteltas, supra note 3.
10

Matter of the City of New York, supra note 4; Weeks v. Weeks, 106 N.

Y. 626, 13 N. E. 96 (1887).

' In re Hubbell's Trust, supra note 3.

1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT §22, at 212-213.
'O'TooL,, supra note 3; Matter of the City of New York, supra note 4.
,Gomez v. Gomez, 147 N. Y. 195, 41 N. E. 420 (1895).
"
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to lease the trust property so as to bind the interest of the remaindermen.
The courts have always recognized two distinct estates in trusts
of real property; that of the remainderman and that of the trustee. 15
Obviously, if the trustee and the remaindermen join in the execution of the lease, it will be valid however long the term. 16 It would
be to the advantage of the lessees to have the persons who are to take
the property after the termination of the trust join in the execution
of the lease. This is propably the most convenient and best means
to insure the tenant of his term, if alremaindermen are of age and
competent.
The settlor can, by express language, empower the trustee to
lease for any period extending either during or after the trust estate,7
but the language granting such power must be clear and unequivocal.1
It is only when the settlor uses such phrases as: "that the trustee
shall have power to lease for any term he think proper," whether to
extend beyond his estate or not, that he gives him express power to
bind the remainder of reversion. "If he deem * * * it for the advantage of the said trust, to lease the said property for a term extending beyond the duration of the said trust" authorizes a lease for
twenty-one years with the right to renewal for another twenty-one
years.18 The usual provision that he shall collect the rents and
profits is not sufficient to give the trustee power to bind the property
after the termination of his estate.19 Power "to rent from year to
year or any term of years" is not sufficient. 20 "To rent the same
and receive the rents and profits" 21 and "to make leases" are likewise insufficient.
An express power to lease given in general terms
22
is insufficient.
When the trustee is given power to lease in the trust instrument,
it is to be complied with strictly. 23 A power to make leases "for
twenty-one years from the making thereof" does not justify a lease
for twenty-one years to begin in the future, or a lease for twenty-one
years with right to renew for two similar terms.24 And a power to
lease "for the best rent attainable" does not authorize a lease for a
lesser rent. 25 Where there is power to lease for a certain number
of years, a lease for a shorter number is good, but a lease for a
longer term than that prescribed is bad, as contrary to the power; 26
'Losey v. Stanley, 147 N. Y. 560, 42 N. E. 8 (1895).
'Il1 TIFFANY, trpra note 12; Reynolds v. Browning, King, 217 App. Div.
443, 217 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1st Dept. 1926).
" Matter of the City of New York, supra note 4, at 33.
"s Reynolds v. Browning, King, supra note 16.
" Matter of McCaffrey, 50 Hun 371, 3 N. Y. Supp. 96 (1888).
'MMatter of the City of New York, supra note 4.
'iMatter of Armory Board, supra note 4.

0 Ibid.

'2

PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (6th ed. 1911) §529.
Griffen v. Ford, 1 Bosw. 123 (N. Y. 1857).

=Ibid.
"

Sinclair v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 581 (N. Y. 1826).
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such a lease may be sustained in27equity for the proper number of
years and only the excess is void.
Sections 106 and 107 of the Real Property Law are the only
statutes authorizing trustees to lease for terms which will extend
beyond the termination of the trust.2 8

Previous to the enactment of

these sections a trustee had no power, without the consent of the
remaindermen or authority in the trust instrument, to lease and bind
the remaindermen. 29 Such a situation proved to be a hardship upon
the trustee and the lessee, and a detriment to the trust estate. In previous years, as today, many cases arose where the circumstances of the
trust property demanded long term leases, but the trustee had no
power to execute them. The statute provides a means to remedy
the defect in the law and to enlarge the powers of the trustee,
at the
30
same time allowing him to retain his common law powers.
In City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Smith,3' the complaint alleged that the plaintiff holds, as trustee, real property in the city of
New York; it has leased the property, by securing the statutory
approval of the Supreme Court, for a term of twenty years at a
rental of twenty thousand dollars per annum. The tenant has not
paid the full rent, and asserts it will be compelled to vacate the premises unless it can obtain a temporary reduction in the rent, for one
year subject to the trust terminating before that time, from twenty
to twelve thousand dollars per annum; and that plaintiff requested
the consent of the life beneficiaries to a temporary reduction, but
some of them refused. The complaint further alleges that doubt has
arisen as "to the respective rights of the parties, and plaintiff is unable to proceed with the proper administration of the trust unless
said doubt is resolved, said controversy determined, and the respective
rights of the parties declared and the plaintiff instructed as to its
legal duties and authority in the premises."
Upon the motion of one of the defendants in the Supreme Court
of New York County the complaint was dismissed. The dismissal
was affirmed by the Appellate Division, First Department, Justices
Finch and Merrill dissenting.3 2 The Court of Appeals in a decision
written by Lehman, J., unanimously affirmed, and dismissed the
complaint on two grounds:
FIRST. "A question between trustees and beneficiary as to wisdom of action where room for choice does not concern the 'rights
and other legal relations' and forms no basis for a declaratory judgment." 33
' Supra note 23.
='Matter of the City of New York, supra note 4.
'Gomez v. Gomez, supra note 14.
' Weir v. Barker, supra note 3.
'263 N. Y. 292, 189 N. E. 222 (1934).
'238 App. Div. 742, 265 N. Y. Supp. 654 (lst Dept. 1933).
N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE'

ACT

§473.

The Supreme Court shall have the

power in any action or proceeding to declare rights and other legal relations
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The trend of judicial opinion seems to disfavor the granting of
declaratory judgments instructing trustees.34 The courts have promulgated many rules restricting
the right of trustees to secure instruc35
tions from the court.
In recent years the courts have set up another rule; that they
will not advise on purely business questions, 36 but will leave the duty
on the trustee to decide whether, from the business standpoint, an
act should or should not be performed. This is on the theory that
the court can not possibly be placed in possession of all the facts
which necessarily tend to decide the question. 37 This rule seems to
be a limb of the general rule that courts will not advise as to the
proper method of exercising a discretionary power invested solely
in the trustee. It might be well to discuss herein the cases which
have served to establish the "business" rule, so that we may discover
how far the courts have gone.
on request for such declaration whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed, and such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.
RULEs oF Cvm PRACTICE, Rule 212. If, in the opinion of the court, the
parties should be left to relief by existing forms of actions, or for other
reasons, it may decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the
grounds on which its discretion is so exercised.
' CARMODY'S NEW YORK PRACTICE §305, subd. 3: "The court must in the
exercise of its discretion be on its guard lest it be called upon to make
declarations where no controversy exists or is likely to exist, and the request
for the declaration is found only in the fear of the plaintiff that a claim may
possibly be asserted against him."
To the same effect see 1 LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1929) §495.

1 See 2

LAWRENCE,

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

(1929)

§900; id. §495; 2

PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (6th ed. 1911) §476a, note a.
Declaratory judgments will not be granted:
1. Where no bona fide controversy exists.
2. Where no real need for it exists. A useful purpose must be
served; not granted where question requires no action by trustee.
3. Where its only purpose is to determine a question already passed
upon.
4. Where it would embarrass another tribunal before whom the
question is properly pending.
5. Nor where another remedy is available,--whether it be statutory
or not.
6. To relieve the trustee of his discretionary powers.
7. Unless the trustee is honestly in doubt as to the law.
5In re Gallmar, 79 Misc. 592, 141 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1913) ; In re Hanna's
Est., 119 Misc. 285, 196 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1922); Matter of Ebbet's Estate,
139 Misc. 250, 248 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1931); Matter of Pulitzer's Estate, 139
Misc. 575, 249 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1931) ; In re Weissman's Will, 140 Misc. 360,
250 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1931) ; In re Wander's Will, 141 Misc. 584, 252 N. Y.
Supp. 813 (1931).
t

Ibid.
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In re Gallmar11 was a case in which the executor sought the
instruction of the court in regard to the disposal of a second mortgage in his hands. The surrogate refused to advise as the executor,
and not the court, is the responsible officer of the estate. In the
Hanna case the executors prayed for the approval by the court of
certain of their acts in borrowing money and pledging securities of
the estate. In denying the relief demanded the court said,3 9
"If the court attempted to direct executors in such duties, the
court would become the executor, and would be foreclosed
upon a final accounting to hear objections urged against the
acts of the executors."
In the same case the petitioner attempted to justify its entry into

court by Section 215 of the Surrogate's Court Act.40

The court,

in this case, as in others, 41 strictly construed the statute and held that
all matters other than the sale of the property were left to the executor or trustee.
In re Ebbet's Will,42 the trustee applied for advice and direction

of the court regarding their action or inaction in respect to voting
a controlling number of shares of stock in the Brooklyn Baseball
Club forming a part of the corpus of the estate. It was shown the
seating facilities were greatly inadequate to accommodate the spectators. To avoid a loss it was proposed to mortage the real property.
The court decided the trustee had the legal right to take the action
proposed, but whether or not he should was a question of business
judgment for the trustee to decide.
"The question here presented is, therefore, a question not
of law, but of business judgment in the conduct of the affairs
of the corporations involved, which question is imposed upon
and must be solved by the executor-trustee by reason of his
assumption of the office.
"The final decision in the matter must be made by the
trustees and not by the court. They have the legal right to
take the action proposed, the business advisability of which is
not a question properly determinable by this court."
In the Pulitzer case 43 the question was whether the trustees had
the legal right to sell the assets of a corporation, a majority of the
'Supra note 36.
'Supra
note 36.allows executors and testamentary trustees to receive the
"0This section
advice and direction of the court as to the propriety, price, manner and time of
sale of the trust property.
'I
re Murray's Will, 128 Misc. 798, 220 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1921) and
cases cited therein.
'Supra note 36.
'Supra note 36.
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stock being owned by the trust estate and whether the surrogate had
power to approve the sale. It was decided that the trustee had the
right, but the court refused to lend its approval of the contract on
the grounds that it had no power to interfere with the internal
mechanism of the corporation and the other stockholders. In view of
the cases it could as well have refused to approve because it was a
question of business judgment resting solely on the trustee.
In re Weissman's Will,44 the Guaranty Trust Co., accounting
as executor, sought the advice of the court respecting the advisability
of its abandoning certain real property of the estate. In declining
the request for advice the court said:
"In view of the familiar claims of corporate fiduciaries respecting their pre-eminent qualifications in the solution of such
problems, the implied compliment to the business sagacity of
the court is not inconsiderable.
"The executor has the power to abandon worthless assets
of the estate. Whether or not the property in question is of
this description is for the executor, and not for the court to
decide."
In re Wander's Will,45 the trustee desired judicial approval of a

plan to dispose of the business of the estate at a titne prior to that
directed in the will. The questions were: 1. Did he have the legal
right? 2. Is the proposed sale desirable from a business standpoint?
The court answered the first question in the affirmative and in refusing to answer the second, said:
"It is substantiallyimpossible for the estate fiduciary, by mere
written words or even testimony adduced upon the hearing to
put the court into possession of all the facts pertinent to such
a business decision. Even were this possible, the court must
of necessity remain ignorant of those more or less intangible
facts and conditions ascertainable only from personal association with the subject-matter and persons involved, which inevitably play so large a part in reaching any business question."
In the above cases the trustees were attempting to overcome the
possibilities of a surcharge upon a subsequent showing that the transaction in question should have been consummated differently. To
accomplish this purpose they sought the approval of the court and
tried to place the cumbersome duty of acting wisely, as shown by
later events, upon the court.
"Supra note 36.
' Supra note 36.
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If the complaint in City Bank Farmers Trust v. Smith

46

had not

been dismissed the plaintiff would have proven the tenant was judgment proof and unable to pay the rent, that ultimately the estate
would suffer if the rent was not reduced. The plaintiff would then
be directed to reduce the rent. Such a direction was the basis for
this suit. If it had been granted the plaintiff would thus be saved
from a surcharge if the rent actually should not have been reduced.
In such a situation the "business" rule would be involved. The court
foresaw this and properly dismissed the complaint.
Taking a factual view of the case the court has found another
set of facts to which the "business" rule applies. From a legal point
of view the case shows that the Court of Appeals concurs with the
lower courts in so exercising the judicial discretion that questions of
business judgment will be decided by the trustee and not by the
court.
SECOND. That the plaintiff could not get a declaratory judgment instructing him as to his rights because there was no doubt
about the law in question.
The plaintiff won a reargument on the grounds that it had no
opportunity to argue whether or not doubt did exist. On the reargument the court adhered to its prior opinion. In City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Smith47 the court decided that a trustee, after
securing the statutory approval of the Supreme Court for a long
term lease, has no authority to modify the terms of said lease, without a like approval by the court.
The contention of the plaintiff was: In all trust property we
find two distinct estates, that of the trustee and that of the remainderman. The statute gave the trustee a means of leasing to bind
the remainder, at the same time, according to the decisions, allowing
him to retain his common law powers. At common law he had complete control over his own estate, but none over the remainder. Therefore he can still control the trust estate and, in exercising this control,
can modify an approved long term lease to continue until the termination of his estate. All of the cases cited by the plaintiff to substantiate his argument that the trustee retained his common law
powers dealt with the first sentence of Section 106, none of them arose
out of a lease approved by the court.
Weir v. Barker 48 was a suit to enforce a renewal option under
a lease for five years with the right to renew for five years. The
defense alleged the lease was absolutely void because it was for more
than five years and the court's approval was lacking. The court held
the lease was not void, but was valid for the term of the trust. The

court said: 49

' Supra note 2.
'1264
N. Y. 396, 191 N. E. 720 (1934).
"8Supra note 3.
" Supra note 3, at 114.
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"The statute did not assume to provide exclusive rules
governing the conduct of the trustee in the administration of
the trust estate, but left that matter to be controlled by thei
vules of the common law applicable thereto, except so far as
the statute expressly or by implication dealt with the subject."
In Matter of the City of New York (110th St.) 50 the question
was the value, on condemnation proceedings, of a leasehold estate.
The lease was for twenty years and its validity was attacked. The
court held the lease was valid so long as the trust existed, and indemnified the tenant on the basis of the probable duration of the
trust.
In Frankford Trust Co. v. Schulte 51 the court in construing a
statute of Pennsylvania similar to our Section 106, Real Property
Law, quoted extensively and with approval from Weir v. Barker.
The above cases held a trustee retains his common law authority
to lease for a term to extend only to the termination of the trust.
All of those cases were decided under the first sentence of Section
106. Now, for the first time, we have a case under the second sentence. Did it hold that a trustee retains all his common law powers?
The answer is in the negative.
The court in the recent case 52 said: "The statute provides that
if that (the 'best interest of the trust estate' dictates a long term
lease) is shown to 'the satisfaction of the court,' it may authorize
the trustee to lease such property for a term exceeding five years
'upon such terms and conditions as seem just and proper.' The
statute was not intended to restrict the power of the trustee without
the approval of the court to enter into a lease for a term exceeding
five years which would be valid so long as the trust continues."
Again,5 3 "In order to promote the best interest of the trust estate,
a trustee may, at times, waive a breach of the provisions of the
lease."
The court has said that the trustee has retained certain of his
common law powers, i. e., the right to lease for the duration of the
trust, the right to waive a breach of an approved condition. Concerning his common law right to control the trust estate, as differentiated
from the remainder, in relation to the modification, the court said
the statute in clear language places the duty of being "satisfied" upon
the court.
"The purpose of the statute would be frustrated if, after the
court had fixed the terms and conditions which are proper,
those terms and conditions might be changed in accordance
r' Supra note 4.
"'Supra note 3.
' Sufpra note 2, at 398.

raIbid.
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with the discretion of the trustee during the duration of the
trust estate." 54

The underlying theory behind this and the previous decisions
under this statute is, the trustee retains his common law powers, but
in any case where a power is inconsistent with the statute, the courts
will hold the common law right fails and the statute prevails. It
has been asserted that, since this right was unknown to the common
law, he has only those powers which the statute gi'es him. In view
of the cases, this assertion seems to be erroneous. In future cases
arising under this section as to whether or not the trustee retains
a common law power, the answer will be found in the answer to
the question: Is the retention of the common law right inconsistent
with the statute?
Conclusion.
A trustee has implied authority to lease the trust property. A
lease based on this implied power is valid only so long as the trust
continues. The trustee can lease for a term to extend beyond the
trust by consent of remaindermen, express authority or statute.
Under the statute, a lease for a term of five years or less will bind
the remainder if the trust should terminate before the expiration of
the five years; or, the trustee can lease for a longer term by securing
the approval of the court. After securing the approval of the court,
he has no authority to modify the terms of the lease, without a E'ke
approval by the court, but courts will not advise and direct trustees
as to business questions.
LEO F. BOLAND.

LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR NUISANCE.

"A municipality being not only a public agency but also, a quasiprivate individual is therefore subject to the law. For its wrong to
the public it may be prosecuted; for its torts against individualsv it
may in the proper case be sued in civil action for damages like a
private corporation. 1
To formulate a rule as to the liability of a municipal corporation for tort is impossible. This condition is not only due to the
" Supra note 3, at 399.
143 C. J. 920; Conrad v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158 (1859); Healy v. New York,
3 Hun 708 (1857).

